in a system that differentiates between "honest" and "culpable" bankrupts will only be worthwhile if credit providers are prepared to treat the former significantly more favourably than the latter. 2 impact of the Enterprise Act on corporate insolvency, less attention has been given to the Act's reform of the law of personal insolvency. Yet in a society experiencing record levels of personal indebtedness, there is an increasing need to ensure that the available legal responses to individual financial distress are appropriate and fit for purpose. This paper therefore seeks to redress the balance by offering an appraisal of the present bankruptcy system.
A. INTRODUCTION
economy across the pond, it is not surprising to find that European policy makers have also looked to the United States for inspiration.
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In keeping with the policy outlined, the new law has three main structural elements: (i) the reduction in the duration of bankruptcy, (ii) the lifting of statutory restrictions and disabilities hitherto imposed on undischarged bankrupts and (iii) a new regime of post-discharge restrictions designed to deal with what have been termed "irresponsible" or "culpable" bankrupts. Taken in combination, these elements are designed to deliver the "fresh start" policy. A fourth element is the 9 
Best Project on Restructuring, Bankruptcy and a Fresh Start: Final Report of the Expert Group
(September 2003) ("the Best Project Report") available at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/ entrepreneurship/support_measures/>. The point is reinforced in the Expert Group's recommendation at para 7.3.2. The Best Project Report also cites the Enterprise Act reforms as examples of good practice at para 5.3.2. 10 Ibid, para 2.1. 11 The conclusions of the Best Project Report were based on an earlier study carried out at the instigation of the European Commission entitled Bankruptcy and a fresh start: Stigma on failure and legal consequences of bankruptcy (July 2002) , full text at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/entrepreneurship/support_measures/failure_ bankruptcy/bankruptcy.htm>. This study examined attitudes to business failure and the legal consequences of insolvency within the member states and used the United States as its external comparator.
introduction of a "fast-track" voluntary arrangement procedure to be overseen by the official receiver. This seeks to channel debtors who have the means to contribute towards payment of their debts away from bankruptcy and into an approved voluntary arrangement. The attempt to promote individual voluntary arrangements as an alternative to bankruptcy at a time when, in some eyes, the implementation of the "fresh start" policy has made bankruptcy more attractive, is an interesting feature of the overall package. After consideration of the basic structure and functions of personal insolvency law in England and Wales, the paper proceeds to examine the four elements in turn and to draw some tentative conclusions as to their likely cumulative impact. The paper is concerned only with the position in England and
Wales.
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B. THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF PERSONAL INSOLVENCY LAW
Bankruptcy
The law's ultimate formal response to personal insolvency is bankruptcy. Bankruptcy has been described as "a compact to which there are three parties: the debtor, his creditors and society."
13
As between the bankrupt debtor and his creditors, bankruptcy can be seen as a form of statutory composition. The debtor's non-exempt assets 14 are gathered in, realised and the proceeds distributed among his creditors.
The debtor can also be required, to a limited extent, to contribute towards the payment of his debts out of ongoing income. 15 In return for surrendering his assets (and, possibly, a limited portion of his income), the debtor obtains automatic discharge of 12 The law relating to personal insolvency law is a devolved matter and, accordingly, the reforms have no application in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The Scottish Executive has conducted its own consultation process: 15 Ibid, s 310 and Section C, infra.
exempting certain property from the bankruptcy estate, by discharging the debtor from his obligations and by preventing the creditors from capturing the debtor's future assets and income for the bankruptcy estate, insolvency law, in theory, gives the debtor scope to resume participation in the credit economy and liberates him to make a productive contribution to society free from the burden of his debts. At the same time, there are certain categories of debt that are not dischargeable for policy reasons. 28 So, for example, discharge does not release the debtor from any bankruptcy debt incurred through fraud or fraudulent breach of trust and the scope of the discharge in English law is limited accordingly. 29 Insolvency law therefore seeks to strike a balance between the interest of creditors in recovering what they are owed and the interest of debtors in pursuing their lives productively without a millstone of debt around their necks. 30 In striking the balance, most legal systems recognise that some form of discharge, whether automatic or court-granted, is necessary. 31 However, it is clear that the law can be calibrated in a variety of different ways. Thus, under Chapter 7 of the US Bankruptcy Code, which is generally perceived as perhaps the most "pro-debtor" bankruptcy regime in the world, the scope for assets to be kept out of the bankruptcy estate is, broadly speaking, more generous than it is in English 24 Ibid, s 283(2) but note the effect of s 308. Property subject to a restraint order under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 is also excluded from the bankrupt's estate: see s 417 of that Act and IA, s 306A. 25 IA, ss 278-81 and Section C, infra. 26 Bankruptcy converts rights against the debtor into rights against the debtor's estate: see Re Ravichandran [2004] BPIR 814. 27 Nor can they claim the benefit of future pension rights. The decision in Re Landau [1998] Ch 223 established that the debtor's contractual rights under a personal pension scheme were "property" within IA, s 436 that formed part of the bankruptcy estate and vested in the trustee in bankruptcy. However, Re Landau was reversed by the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999, s 11 for bankruptcies where the petition was presented after 29 May 2000. 28 IA, s 281. 29 Ibid, s 281 (3) . Note also the Higher Education Act 2004 which provides that student loan debts will no longer be released on discharge. 30 law, but the scope of the discharge is more limited because there are many more categories of non-dischargeable debts.
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While society has an interest in the bankruptcy process as a means of rehabilitating debtors and encouraging them to make a productive contribution, the forgiveness of debtors also has social costs. Firstly, society as a whole must bear the economic cost of individual default. Secondly, the provision of a generous discharge inevitably involves some erosion of social norms of individual responsibility and sanctity of contract that emphasise the moral importance of promise keeping. 33 As well as requiring the debtor to relinquish his assets, the insolvency law of England and Wales has long exacted a further price for the benefits of bankruptcy relief. All bankrupts face having their affairs investigated by the state through the office of the official receiver, 34 a process that exposes them to possible prosecution in the event that offences have been committed, to public examination in court and (now) to the possible imposition of post-discharge restrictions. 35 Historically, the bankrupt debtor has also been made the subject of legal restrictions and disabilities preventing him from participating in certain aspects of public life and from holding certain offices and appointments. 36 These disciplinary consequences of bankruptcy reflect the view that the debtor's failure to meet his obligations is a matter of public concern that creates risks for the community as a whole and so ought to be investigated and sanctioned. 37 Bankruptcy law therefore intrudes into the affairs of the debtor in the 32 See US Bankruptcy Code, ss 522-523 and 541. Although bankruptcy law is generally a federal matter in the United States, the individual states retain the power to set exemptions. As a result, some states have extremely generous "homestead" exemptions that allow the family home (or a portion of the equity) to be kept out of the bankruptcy estate: see CJ Tabb, 35 Under the Bankruptcy Acts of 1883 and 1914 public examination was compulsory and the debtor could not obtain his discharge until his examination had been concluded. The position now is that a public examination is only held if the official receiver applies for one (usually on grounds of the debtor's failure to co-operate in the investigation into his affairs) or if the creditors force the official receiver's hand: see IA, s 290. The post-discharge restrictions regime is discussed further in Section E, infra. 36 Cork Report, paras 131-2 and see further Section D. 37 Cork Report, paras 38, 51-53. This view is exemplified by the Bankruptcy Act 1883 under which the office of the official receiver was first established. The philosophy of the 1883 Act still resonates within the framework and administration of the modern law.
interests of creditors ⎯ to ensure that the debtor's assets are identified and surrendered ⎯ and in the wider public interest.
A final point, which is of considerable importance given the orientation of the reforms, is that access to the bankruptcy process is not limited to debtors whose debts are wholly or primarily business debts. Consumer debtors ⎯ meaning debtors whose debts have been incurred primarily for personal, family or household purposes 38 ⎯ are not excluded. Up until the mid-nineteenth century the law distinguished sharply between traders, who were amenable to bankruptcy, and non-traders who were not.
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The necessity of credit for business and, accordingly, the necessity for mechanisms to deal with business default were well understood at least from the Industrial Revolution onwards, if not before. 40 However, the social and cultural acceptance of consumer credit followed much later. For purposes of access to bankruptcy, the trader/non-trader distinction was not abolished until 1861. Within a decade, the powers of the courts to imprison debtors were also radically reduced. 41 In modern society where economic growth depends to a significant degree on consumer spending which, in turn, is structurally dependent on high levels of consumer credit and personal indebtedness, the provision of legal mechanisms for the relief of consumer debtors is arguably a moral imperative. This is a fortiori given that we live in a society that actively encourages us to consume now and pay later, thereby increasing the scope for default. 42 Aggregate household debt is not itself a measure of financial distress as in a climate of rising incomes and falling interest rates, individuals can be expected to take on and service greater amounts of debt. However, individuals who are highly leveraged are likely to become overextended should they suffer a sudden loss of income as a result of health problems, redundancy or a change in family circumstances, such as divorce. 43 Thus, a combination of rising household 38 Borrowing from the definition of "consumer debt" in the US Bankruptcy Code, s 101(8 40 See Weisberg, supra n 39 for a classic account of the social transformation of the merchant debtor from "social deviant" to "noble and vulnerable statesman… whom the law should protect from the cruel contingencies of economic life". 41 Debtors Act 1869. 42 It is perhaps symbolic of the widespread availability of consumer credit that one of the latest entrants into an already crowded market place is a spin-off from the well-known low-cost airline rejoicing in the name "easyMoney": see <http://www.easymoneycreditcard.com>. 43 For the view (in the American context) that consumer bankruptcies are the product of sudden changes in household circumstances see T Sullivan et al., As We Forgive Our Debtors (New York, indebtedness, increasing vulnerability to sudden changes in circumstances and the lack of any legal differentiation between business and consumer debtors may go some way to explaining the significant increase in the numbers of consumer bankruptcies that we have experienced in recent times. The government has acknowledged this phenomenon 44 and, while its enterprise policy is the main driver behind bankruptcy law reform, the current position is that bankruptcy continues to be available to all debtors. 45 However, it has also acknowledged that alternative solutions, specifically tailored to the problems of consumer debtors, may have to be considered. 46 Moreover, concerns about lending practices and levels of consumer over-indebtedness are already helping to drive supply-side reform of the consumer credit legislation.
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Opinion is divided over whether the use of bankruptcy as a mode of debt relief for consumer debtors should be encouraged. Perhaps unsurprisingly, during the Enterprise Bill's passage, there were some within the lending community who lobbied for a two-tier bankruptcy regime under which consumer debtors would be treated less favourably than business debtors. On the other side of the debate, the National Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux, which favours equal access of consumer debtors to bankruptcy relief, argued that those of its members' clients who have substantial debt problems are effectively denied access to bankruptcy because they cannot afford the court fee and the official receiver's deposit. Accordingly, it recommended a fee exemption for those on low incomes or means-tested benefits.
48
Beyond reiterating the point that a society that encourages credit is morally beholden to provide mechanisms for dealing with the problems of financial overextension that 
County court administration orders
The county court administration order procedure provides a limited means for dealing with debt problems that is independent of the bankruptcy system. unnecessary or concluded, the bankrupt will be discharged on the date the notice is filed. 63 Subject to what is said below about the court's limited power to suspend discharge, it follows that debtors will generally be entitled to discharge no later than one year after the date of the bankruptcy order, a reduction from the previous periods of three years and two years in the case of summary administration. 64 This marks the latest stage in the evolution of a process started by the Insolvency Act 1976. a summary administration) will therefore benefit from an earlier discharge.
66
Moreover, so long as such pre-commencement bankrupts continue to co-operate with the official receiver or their trustee in bankruptcy between 1 April 2004 and the discharge date, they have no exposure under the post-discharge restrictions regime.
67
Considered in isolation the change has no impact on the formal structure of bankruptcy law. The debtor's non-exempt assets, including after-acquired assets, must still be surrendered. The reduction in the period between adjudication and discharge does not directly affect the scope of the provisions on exempt property 68 and non-dischargeable debts. 69 The debtor remains under continuing obligations to provide the official receiver and his trustee in bankruptcy with information about his affairs (such as information that may assist in the identification of assets that form part of the estate) both before and after discharge. 70 Likewise the trustee remains under a duty to carry out his remaining functions in relation to the estate until such time as he obtains his release under section 299 of the Insolvency Act. In these respects, the creditors are getting the same deal. As the bankruptcy debts will be discharged at some point, it may not much matter from the creditors' perspective when they are discharged, be that after one year or some longer period. 71 However, the practical significance of the change lies in the time constraints that it imposes on the official receiver and the trustee with regard to the scope and administration of the bankruptcy.
The official receiver will be under pressure to complete his investigations and, if necessary, procure the issue of proceedings for a bankruptcy restrictions order 72 within the one-year period. Similarly, the trustee must bring any application for an income payments order 73 before discharge. A further point is that after-acquired property can only be captured for the estate to the extent that it is 66 Under the transitional provisions, there is an exception if a certificate of summary administration is revoked on or before 1 April 2004: see Commencement Order, art 8. Also, any existing order suspending a pre-commencement bankrupt's discharge will continue in effect by virtue of Enterprise Act 2002, Sch 19, para 4(2). 67 Ibid, art 7 and Section E, infra. 68 IA, s 283. 69 Ibid, s 281. 70 Ibid, ss 291(4), (5); 333(1), (3) . 71 See Fresh Start, para 7.2. This ignores the point that bankruptcy may have a salutary effect as regards reacquisition of credit: see the Finance and Leasing Association's response to Fresh Start (suggesting that lenders may be less sympathetic to former bankrupts in a system which discharges them after six months than in a system which discharges them after, say, three years) at <http://www.fla.org.uk/fla_home/Consultation_Papers/bankruptcy.doc>. 72 Section E, infra. Note, however, that a prosecution for a bankruptcy offence in Part IX, Chapter VI of the Insolvency Act can be commenced after discharge: IA, s 350(3). 73 Section C4, infra.
acquired by, or devolves upon, the bankrupt before discharge. It was concern about the time needed to carry out a proper investigation of debtors' financial circumstances that prompted the government to shelve its original proposal to reduce the duration of bankruptcy to six months.
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One striking feature of the overall reform package is that, while a regime designed to distinguish between honest and culpable bankrupts is now in place, 75 the availability of the automatic discharge does not, as a general rule, depend on the debtor's conduct. All debtors, regardless of whether or not they are made the subject of a bankruptcy restrictions order, are entitled to be discharged after one year. The post-discharge restrictions regime is concerned only to protect the public in the future from those who have engaged in misconduct. Misconduct that would give grounds for a bankruptcy restrictions order does not under the law as it stands give grounds for discharge to be refused absolutely. 76 The court does have a limited power under section 279(3) of the Insolvency Act to suspend discharge on the application of the official receiver or the trustee 77 until the end of a specified period, or the fulfilment of a specified condition. However, the court can only exercise this power if satisfied that the bankrupt has failed or is failing to comply with his obligations to the official receiver and/or his trustee. 78 It therefore provides a limited mechanism that is used in practice to compel the debtor to co-operate with those who are administering his affairs for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate. It cannot be used to deny discharge absolutely. 79 In one sense, nothing has changed. Under the old law, debtors were entitled to automatic discharge after three years (or two years in the case of summary administration) regardless of their conduct, subject only to the court's power to 74 Fresh Start, para 7.4 and see also the Finance and Leasing Association's consultation response, supra n 71. 75 Section E, infra. 76 Contrast the position under section 727 of the US Bankruptcy Code which contains several instances of misconduct that will ground denial of discharge in a Chapter 7 case: see Tabb, supra n 32, 701-11. 77 Under the previous law, only the official receiver could apply. As a consequence, if the occasion arose, the trustee in bankruptcy needed to give sufficient notice to enable the official receiver to make the application before the debtor was automatically discharged. suspend discharge in the manner just described. This prompted the criticism that bankruptcy law did not sufficiently differentiate between honest and culpable bankrupts. 80 The post-discharge restrictions regime is designed to meet this criticism.
However, it must be emphasised that the differentiation is achieved through the imposition of restrictions and disabilities on culpable bankrupts. There is no general power to deny discharge, even where the debtor's conduct has been particularly egregious.
"Repeat" bankrupts
Under the old law, an individual who had been an undischarged bankrupt at any time in the period of 15 years ending with the most recent bankruptcy order could only be discharged by the court under section 280 of the Insolvency Act and the application for discharge could not be made until five years had elapsed from the date of such order. However, a "repeat" bankrupt whose most recent bankruptcy commenced on or after 1 April 2004 is no longer subject to the old law and will be entitled to a further automatic discharge one year after the order.
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Structurally, this is a significant extension of the "fresh start" policy because it treats a second-time or even a serial bankrupt in exactly the same way as a first-time bankrupt. All are entitled to the discharge; all are exposed to a bankruptcy restrictions order should their conduct merit it. The mere fact of "repeat" bankruptcy is neither a ground for denying discharge nor a ground for a bankruptcy restrictions order. At the level of policy, this reflects the acceptance that the honest entrepreneur may legitimately fail more than once and is consistent with the attempt to foster progressive attitudes towards such failure. Even so, the position in relation to "repeat" bankrupts is now prima facie more liberal than the corresponding position in the United States where, under the Bankruptcy Code, the receipt of a discharge within six years of a subsequent filing is a ground for denial of discharge. 82 The principal sanction available to combat serial abuse of bankruptcy in England and Wales is the post-discharge restrictions regime discussed in Section E.
The bankrupt's home
Section 261 of the Enterprise Act inserts two new sections into the Insolvency Act which restrict the ability of a trustee in bankruptcy to realise the bankrupt's interest in a dwelling-house. Section 283A of the Insolvency Act applies in relation to the bankrupt's interest in a dwelling-house which at the date of the bankruptcy was the sole or principal residence of the bankrupt, the bankrupt's spouse or former spouse. It is clear that such an interest forms part of the bankrupt's estate and vests in his trustee in bankruptcy for the benefit of his creditors. 83 We have seen that bankruptcy discharge does not affect the administration of the bankruptcy estate, which may continue for many years. Assets in the estate can therefore be realised either before or after the debtor is discharged. Under the old law, it was open to the trustee to speculate in a rising market and delay realising the debtor's interest in his home to take advantage of any subsequent price rise. Given the recent housing market boom, this proved to be an attractive strategy. However, it meant that the former bankrupt and his family often faced the prospect of having to wait years for the position to be resolved. On the premise that this state of affairs was inequitable, 84 section 283A
provides that the trustee must take steps to deal with the bankrupt's interest in the manner set out in section 283A(3) within three years beginning with the date of bankruptcy or else the interest will cease to be comprised in the estate and will re-vest in the bankrupt. 85 If the bankrupt does not inform the trustee or official receiver of the interest within the first three months of the bankruptcy then the three years will only start to run from the date on which either of them becomes aware of it. 86 The requirement on the trustee to "use it or lose it" benefits bankrupts in the sense that 83 85 For consequential administrative provisions dealing with re-vesting see IR, rr 6.237A-B. 86 IA, s 283A(5). The court has power to substitute a longer period than three years and there are various rule-making powers that give scope for the three-year period to be reduced or the provision to be disapplied altogether: IA, s 283A(6)-(9); IR, r 237C. It is also open to the trustee in bankruptcy to surrender his interest to the bankrupt where the continued vesting of the property in the estate is of no benefit to creditors or its re-vesting will facilitate a more efficient administration: IR, r 6.237CA. they and their families will at least know where they stand within a reasonable period of time in relation to what may often be the main asset in the bankruptcy. Precommencement bankrupts also benefit under the transitional provisions in section 261(7)-(10) of the Enterprise Act. The effect of these provisions is that the trustee of the estate of any pre-commencement bankrupt that is still under administration will need to take steps to realise the bankrupt's interest in a dwelling-house caught by section 283A(1) within three years from 1 April 2004.
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The second provision is section 313A of the Insolvency Act. This has the same scope as section 283A(1) in that it applies where property comprised in the estate consists of an interest in a dwelling-house which at the date of the bankruptcy was the sole or principal residence of the bankrupt, the bankrupt's spouse or former spouse.
Under section 313A, if the value of the bankrupt's interest is below the prescribed level, 88 the court is obliged to dismiss any application by the trustee for an order for sale or possession or for a charging order under section 313. Again, this is a prodebtor measure designed to protect debtors with low-value interests from having their home and family lives disrupted when, at best, the benefit to creditors may be marginal given that the costs of realisation are likely to absorb a considerable part of the proceeds. It should be noted that section 283A and 313A are an addition to the existing provisions in sections 335A-337 which, to a limited extent, protect the occupation rights of the bankrupt and his family.
Income payment orders
A bankrupt's income does not automatically vest in his trustee in bankruptcy.
However, section 310 of the Insolvency Act provides a mechanism ⎯ the income payments order ("IPO") ⎯ whereby surplus income over and above that necessary to meet the reasonable domestic needs of the debtor and his family can be captured for the estate. 89 The underlying policy is that those who have sufficient income should be required for a finite period of time to make some contribution towards payment of their bankruptcy debts for the benefit of creditors. The government has emphasised that nothing in the overall reform package is intended to detract from this "can pay,
should pay" policy. 90 To further this aspect of policy, the Enterprise Act makes two refinements to the existing system. Firstly, section 259 of the Enterprise Act amends section 310(6) to provide that an IPO can continue in effect beyond discharge but may not end after the period of three years beginning with the date on which it was made.
Under the previous law, the general rule was that IPOs should not have effect after discharge and, although by virtue of the former section 310(6)(b), the court could provide for the order to continue in force after discharge (but for no longer than three years after the making of the order), it was almost universal practice for the courts to provide for the order to cease to have effect on discharge. The amendment is therefore designed to encourage the court to make full use of the jurisdiction for the benefit of creditors while, through retention of the three-year time limit, striking a balance between the interests of creditors and debtor rehabilitation. Secondly, section 260 of the Enterprise Act inserts a new section 310A into the Insolvency Act which provides that the debtor and his trustee (or, where appropriate, the official receiver)
can enter into a binding income payments agreement ("IPA") without the need for a court order under section 310. Like IPOs, IPAs are capable of running beyond discharge for up to a maximum of three years from the date of the agreement and they can be enforced in exactly the same way. 91 By removing the necessity for a court order, section 310A is designed to reduce costs and produce better returns for creditors. As the available evidence suggests that the majority of IPOs are obtained with the consent of the debtor, 92 the provision of an out-of-court means to achieve the same result is sensible. Indeed, the creation of an administrative system alongside the court-based IPO system reflects a general legislative trend in favour of parallel courtbased and out-of-court schemes that offer the possibility of a cost-effective outcome while providing the fall-back of a formal court route should the parties fail to agree.
In the present context, the original model was the disqualification undertakings regime. 93 The post-discharge restrictions regime is also designed in this way. 
Summary
The basic structure of bankruptcy law, at least as it affects the debtor and his creditors, has not changed. All debtors are entitled to a discharge (in one year rather than two or three years) but in return they must surrender their non-exempt assets.
For debtors with significant assets as well as income, bankruptcy should still be considered a last resort. However, for debtors with no or few assets, the reduction in the discharge period is likely to increase the attractiveness and incidence of It therefore promoted the view that the failure of honest and unfortunate businesspersons is a socially acceptable consequence of a market economy that
should not be stigmatised, given that stigma may actively discourage such persons from participating in the economy in the future and so undermine the "fresh start". As regards the disciplinary effects of bankruptcy, one other change should be mentioned. Section 289 of the Insolvency Act (as substituted by section 258 of the Enterprise Act) obliges the official receiver to investigate the conduct and affairs of each bankrupt (including his conduct and affairs before the making of the bankruptcy order), and make such report (if any) to the court as he thinks fit. This reflects the former provision. However, section 289(2) now also provides that the obligation to investigate does not apply to a case in which the official receiver thinks an investigation is unnecessary. This subsection gave rise to concern during the Enterprise Bill's passage, the main objection being that it would lead to reduced scrutiny and make bankruptcy an "easier ride", particularly for consumer debtors.
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However, it appears that section 289(2) is a product of the abolition of summary administration rather than a significant change of substance. Under the former section 289(5), the official receiver was only obliged to carry out an investigation in a summary case 123 if he thought fit. Section 289(2) therefore preserves a limited discretion that is only likely to be exercised in the context of small bankruptcies. In practice, it is anticipated that all bankrupts will still have to go through the official receiver's standard vetting procedures which are designed (i) to establish whether or not a case should be investigated further with a view to possible prosecution or action under the post-discharge restrictions regime and (ii) to secure and protect the assets with a view to determining whether a creditors' meeting should be called and a private sector insolvency practitioner appointed as trustee. 
Introduction
As we have seen, the principal object of the reforms is to provide honest and unfortunate debtors with a fresh start free from the burden of indebtedness and from stigma, while at the same time penalising the dishonest and irresponsible minority.
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The means chosen to differentiate the "good" from the "bad" is the post-discharge restrictions regime found in section 281A of, and Schedule 4A to, the Insolvency Act. 127 Schedule 4A is modelled on the civil disqualification regime in sections 6-9 of, and Schedule 1 to, the Company Directors' Disqualification Act 1986 ("CDDA").
As between the bankrupt and his creditors, the regime has no effect. All bankrupts are prima facie entitled to automatic discharge regardless of their conduct. 128 The object of the regime is to impose restrictions and disabilities on those whose conduct merits it and thereby protect the public in the future from bankrupts who have acted recklessly, irresponsibly or dishonestly. The theory is that, while such bankrupts will still generally be released from their debts, they should be subjected to continuing restrictions beyond discharge in order to protect the public from any repetition of their misconduct. It is suggested that, in its attempt to differentiate the "honest" from the "culpable", the underlying purpose of regime is to send more sophisticated messages to the credit markets. 126 Fresh Start from para 7.14; Second Chance from para 1.25. 127 Inserted by Enterprise Act 2002, s 257, Sch 4A. It should be pointed out that, while the means chosen are novel, this is not the first legislative attempt to differentiate between "good" and "bad" bankrupts. The first English statute to provide a discharge from bankruptcy debts, 4 Anne, ch 17 (1705), also mandated the imposition of the death penalty on those who had committed fraud. Certificates of conformity (Bankruptcy Consolidation Act 1849) and certificates of misfortune (Bankruptcy Act 1883) were similarly motivated. 128 Schedule 4A, para 2(1) provides that the court "shall grant an application for a BRO if it thinks it appropriate having regard to the conduct of the bankrupt (whether before or after the making of the bankruptcy order)." Despite the use of the word "shall", it is for the court to decide in its discretion whether a BRO is "appropriate" in the light of the bankrupt's conduct and all the relevant circumstances. It is suggested that the courts are likely to follow the approach taken in proceedings under section 8 of the CDDA where, although the power to disqualify is discretionary, the courts have indicated that it will be rare, in the event of proven misconduct, for the discretion to be exercised against the making of an order. 153 Moreover, the courts are likely to be circumspect in deciding, as a matter of discretion, that an order should not be made because (for example) the bankrupt has since "learned his lesson". It is striking that Schedule 4, para 2 contains no equivalent of the basic threshold requirement in CDDA, ss 6(1) and 8(2) that the person's conduct makes him "unfit".
Thus, although a person subject to a BRO is disqualified, among other things, from acting as a director, the appropriateness of a BRO does not expressly depend on whether or not the person is unfit to engage in the restricted activities and capacities.
The lack of any threshold requirement beyond "appropriateness" means that the question the court must decide under Schedule 4A, para 2 is broader than its counterpart under CDDA, ss 6(1) and 8(2). In effect, the court must determine whether it is appropriate on the evidence of the individual's conduct that he be subjected to continuing restrictions in the public interest. Moreover, the court is required to consider the "conduct of the bankrupt" which is potentially wide in scope, whereas under the CDDA, ss 6(1) and 8(2), the court may only consider (respectively) the defendant's "conduct as a director" of the company or "conduct in relation to the company". Nevertheless the conduct must at least be relevant to the bankruptcy and to the purpose of the regime. So the fact, for example, that the bankrupt also happens to be a dangerous motorist would clearly not be relevant. Given the width of the prohibitions that currently flow from bankruptcy restrictions, it is suggested that it is not feasible for the court to ask whether the bankrupt's conduct is such as to require him to be subjected to each and every prohibition. Instead, as in the CDDA context, the courts are likely to formulate the test more widely in the terms of a failure to meet required standards.
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Schedule 4A, para 2(1) provides that the court can take into account the bankrupt's conduct either before or after the making of the bankruptcy order. Thus, as the bankruptcy was still continuing at that date. This is because the court can rely on misconduct during the bankruptcy, such as non-cooperation with the official receiver or trustee, which continued after 1 April 2004.
Schedule 4A, para 2(1) is amplified by paragraph 2(2) which provides that "the court shall, in particular, take into account" any of thirteen specified kinds of behaviour on the part of the bankrupt. Taken collectively, the sheer width of paragraph 2(2) is striking. The kinds of behaviour identified range from downright dishonesty to lesser states of culpability such as negligence, recklessness, incompetence and extravagance. In keeping with the point made earlier in Section B, they are capable of embracing misconduct by consumer as well as business bankrupts. 158 Although the court is required to take into account the various matters that are specifically mentioned, the use of the expression "in particular" makes it clear that paragraph 2 was not intended to be exhaustive. 159 This mirrors the position in relation to CDDA, ss 6 to 9 and Sch 1. 160 So, while not expressly mentioned, the court could presumably take into account, for example, conduct the subject matter of existing criminal offences (such as obtaining credit without disclosure of status in contravention of section 360(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act) or the bankrupt's conduct during the course of a failed IVA where the bankruptcy order was made on a supervisor's petition. 161 There is no specific guidance in Schedule 4A as to the degree of misconduct that will make a BRO appropriate nor is there any indication of the relative weight that the court should give to the various kinds of behaviour specified in paragraph 2(2). It is also unclear whether the specified kinds of behaviour should be given greater weight than other kinds of culpable behaviour that are not specifically mentioned. None of this should come as any surprise given the difficulty of producing a comprehensive legislative definition of "culpable behaviour" and the need for the law to be flexible enough to respond to changing patterns of misconduct over time. Accordingly, the policy behind Schedule 4A rests on the premise that it is best to rely on the expertise and experience of the Secretary of State (through the Insolvency Service) and, ultimately, the judgment of the courts on the merits of individual cases to perform the task of differentiating culpable from non-culpable bankrupts. 162 It cannot be emphasised enough that much will depend on the particular circumstances of each case.
Subject to the caveat that the exercise of the jurisdiction will inevitably be highly fact-sensitive, the following additional points can be made concerning the specific contents of paragraph 2(2) and the direction in which the law is likely to develop:
(1) Several of the kinds of behaviour specified in paragraph 2(2) are identical to or based on the grounds on which the court could formerly refuse to discharge an individual from bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Acts 1883 and 1914. 163 The post-discharge restrictions regime is therefore rooted in the tradition of the old bankruptcy legislation: a case of "back to the future".
(2) In relation to the specific references in paragraph 2(2) to preferences, transactions at undervalue and excessive pension contributions, it is suggested that the court could take into account relevant conduct without the Secretary of State having to establish all the elements that a trustee in bankruptcy would be required to establish in civil recovery proceedings under sections 339, 340 and 342A of the Insolvency Act. 164 Even so, the question of whether a BRO is appropriate will depend on the seriousness of the conduct and, in this respect, it seems clear that, for example, a deliberate strategy of paying off debts owing to friends and relatives, would be regarded as more culpable than a decision to pay one or two pressing creditors who were at arms' length.
(3) Failure to supply goods or services having accepted a customer pre-payment (para 2(2)(f)) and continuing to trade with actual or constructive knowledge of insolvency (para 2(2)(g)) are matters that can also be taken into account by the courts in determining whether a director's conduct makes him unfit to be concerned in the management of a company for the purposes of CDDA, s 6. 165 It seems likely that the court's approach to these types of misconduct under the CDDA will influence the approach to similar conduct under the post-discharge restrictions regime (and, in time, vice versa).
(4) Continuing to trade with actual or constructive knowledge of insolvency (para 2(2)(g)) and incurring before commencement of bankruptcy a debt which the bankrupt had no reasonable expectation of being able to pay (para 2(2)(h)) appear to be overlapping forms of misconduct. However, the former only applies to traders whereas the latter is capable of applying to both traders and consumer bankrupts. Thus, for example, if an individual takes out a personal loan knowing that he has insufficient income to meet the monthly repayments, such conduct would apparently fall within Schedule 4A, para 2(2)(h)). 166 The same is true of individuals who deliberately load expenditure onto credit cards on the eve of bankruptcy. Furthermore, the incurring of a single debt (as opposed to a series of debts) is sufficient to fall within the wording. This does not mean that the incurring of a single debt in the circumstances described will necessarily result in the imposition of a BRO. The court will need to evaluate the bankrupt's conduct in the round and decide whether there is sufficient misconduct to justify a BRO and, by implication, the denial of a complete fresh start free from the stigma of bankruptcy restrictions.
(5) There is some overlap between paragraph 2(2) and the bankruptcy offences in Part IX, Chapter 6 of the Insolvency Act (starting at section 350):
(a) Failure to keep records which account for a loss (para 2(2)(a)) overlaps to some extent with the offence of failure without reasonable excuse to account for or give a satisfactory explanation of the loss of any substantial part of the bankrupt's property in section 354(3) of the Insolvency Act. 165 Walters and Davis-White, supra n 125, chs 4-5. 166 As would the taking out of a consolidation loan where all of the individual's debts are consolidated into a single debt and the individual knows that he still cannot meet the repayment terms. dealing by the bankrupt with property that he had obtained on credit.
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Where the conduct that could be targeted as a possible offence under these provisions occurs after the commencement of bankruptcy (for example, non-disclosure of property in contravention of Insolvency Act, s 353), it could also be classified as failure to co-operate with the official receiver or trustee in bankruptcy (para 2(2)(m)).
(c) The offence of gambling or rash and hazardous speculation formerly contained section 362 of the Insolvency Act has been repealed 173 but is now mirrored in paragraph 2(2)(j) and extended to cover "unreasonable extravagance".
Where there is evidence of misconduct suggesting, prima facie, that a bankruptcy offence under the Insolvency Act has been committed, there will also be a strong prima facie case for a BRO, especially where, for example, the bankrupt has disposed of or concealed assets that form part of his estate to the detriment of his creditors. One problem for the Secretary of State is that the criminal courts have no power equivalent to CDDA, s 2 to impose a BRO following conviction for a bankruptcy offence. The Secretary of State may therefore be forced to consider applying to the civil courts for a BRO in cases where a criminal prosecution has been commenced or is being contemplated. In any event, the Secretary of State 167 IA, ss 353-4. 168 Ibid, s 355. 169 Ibid, s 356. 170 Ibid, s 357. 171 Ibid, s 358. 172 Ibid, s 359. or is failing to co-operate. 175 Suspension of discharge is a powerful sanction as, until the suspension is lifted, the one-year discharge period in section 279(1) ceases to run. Accordingly, the information and asset-gathering provisions of the Insolvency Act that apply up to discharge would continue to have effect. Time will also stop running for the purposes of an application for a BRO. 176 As such, an application for suspension will always be the weapon of first resort. Once the suspension is lifted, it is conceivable that the Secretary of State could rely on the bankrupt's previous failure to co-operate as a ground for a BRO either (i) on a cumulative basis where other kinds of misconduct have come to light in the meantime or (ii) on its own where the failure to co-operate has caused obvious harm to the bankrupt's creditors. 177 It is as yet unclear whether the Secretary of State would seek to rely on the bankrupt's failure to co-operate where such failure had not been regarded as sufficiently serious to merit an application for suspension of discharge. behaviour would give adequate grounds for a BRO although, as has already been stressed, much will depend on the circumstances of the case.
(7) Paragraph 2(2)(k) (neglect of business affairs of a kind which may have materially contributed to or increased the extent of the bankruptcy) permits the court to take into account incompetence on the part of a bankrupt trader. Bearing in mind that paragraph 2(2) is not exhaustive, it is conceivable that the court could impose a BRO on a bankrupt (trader or consumer) where there is evidence of demonstrable inability to manage personal financial affairs. This is especially so where the bankrupt's incompetence has caused harm to his creditors or is of such a degree that he poses a significant risk to the public. 
Repeat bankrupts
We saw in Section C2 that a repeat bankrupt, meaning under the old law, there is likely to be some adjustment to reflect the purpose and spirit of the Enterprise Act. The policy is that an application should normally be made before the bankrupt's discharge under section 279, hence the alignment of the one-year period of bankruptcy with the one-year time limit for a BRO application without the court's permission. 190 Thus, a bankrupt can generally expect to be free of his debts and free from restrictions after a year in accordance with the "fresh start" policy. The primary concern of the Enterprise Act for the rehabilitation of the debtor suggests that the risk to the public will need to be considerable before the court will grant the Secretary of State permission to bring an application for a BRO out of time although each case will turn on its own facts. It follows that any negotiations for a BRU will need to be initiated sufficiently early so as to allow time for an application to the court should those negotiations prove to be unsuccessful.
Any time between the institution and determination of an application for a BRO, the court has the power to make an interim BRO identical in effect to a BRO or BRU if the court thinks that (i) there are prima facie grounds to suggest that the application for the BRO will be successful and (ii) it is in the public interest to make the interim order.
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The purpose of interim BROs is to deal with the position where the Secretary of State applies for a full BRO late within the one-year period and it is not administratively possible for the application to be heard before the date on which the 187 Ibid, Sch 4A, para 3(1)(b 190 The court is unlikely to be sympathetic simply because the applicant has only one year to make the application compared with two years under the CDDA, s. 7. Apart from the case of companies in compulsory liquidation where the official receiver is initially involved, information gathering in CDDA, s 6 cases is dependent on reports from insolvency practitioners. In practice, the reporting procedures may absorb a considerable part of the two-year period in CDDA, s 7(2). Information gathering for BROs is carried out by the official receiver in accordance with the Insolvency Service's vetting procedures and is not dependent on insolvency practitioner reporting, although the trustee in bankruptcy is obliged to provide such information and assistance as the official receiver may reasonably require under IA, s 305 (3) . 191 See generally IA, Sch 4A, paras 5-6. Procedure is governed by IR, rr 6.245-7.
to cover this eventuality, there would be a gap during which the individual would be free from bankruptcy restrictions. It is important to note that the Secretary of State cannot use the interim BRO procedure to buy time in which to pursue further investigations. As already explained, an interim BRO can only be made where an application for a full BRO is on foot and there is a prima facie case. In practice, it is suggested that the courts will treat the application as one for an interim injunction and apply a balance of convenience test. In other words, it is likely that the court will require to be satisfied that the alleged misconduct is so serious that the overall balance of the public interest lies in favour of making the order. As a matter of the domestic law applicable to interim injunctions, it seems unlikely that cross-undertakings in damages will be required from the Secretary of State given that she is acting in a law enforcement role. 193 However, the absence of a cross-undertaking may raise the standard of proof with regard to the need for interim protection and weigh in the balance of convenience against the grant of an interim BRO because, if a final BRO is ultimately refused and the interim BRO should not have been made, the bankrupt may suffer damage that is not remediable. 
The effect of annulment
Where a bankruptcy order is annulled under section 282(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act on the ground that the order ought not to have been made, any BRO, interim BRO or BRU then in force must also be annulled and the former bankrupt cannot be made the subject of a new BRO, interim BRO or undertaking. 195 However, where a bankruptcy order is annulled following either the approval of a post-bankruptcy IVA 196 or the paying of all the bankruptcy debts and expenses, 197 the annulment has no effect on any BRO, interim BRO or BRU already in force. 198 Also, the court has the power to make a BRO and the Secretary of State to accept a BRU in such a case as long as the application was instituted or the BRU offered before the annulment. 199 The underlying policy is that a bankrupt should not be able to buy his way out of a BRO.
Costs
Civil disqualification proceedings under the CDDA are free standing proceedings and the costs usually follow the event. different. An application for a BRO is an ordinary application in the bankruptcy rather than a free standing application. Where an application is made in bankruptcy, the usual order is that any costs will be borne by the bankruptcy estate. This practice is unlikely to be followed in the case of BROs as the public protection provided by the order would effectively be purchased at the expense of the bankrupt's creditors. An alternative would be to order the bankrupt to pay the Secretary of State's costs on the basis that it is the bankrupt's misconduct that occasioned the application. This is a possibility. However, it cuts against the policy of relieving indebtedness regardless of conduct 201 and, it is arguable that if the bankrupt has available income, this should be captured for the estate through an IPO or IPA rather than being absorbed by costs. It follows that the costs may have to be borne, in the first instance, by the Insolvency Service which will therefore want to maximise the use of BRUs. 
Summary
The principal source of discipline in bankruptcy is now the post-discharge restrictions regime. As is the case with civil disqualification under the CDDA, the object of the exercise is to single out and sanction those whose conduct makes them a risk to the public. The system is designed to generate broad standards from the raw material of individual cases and it is expected that patterns will emerge over time in terms of the The answer seems to be: the hope that the public's attitude meaning, in particular, the attitude of lenders to bankrupts who are not subjected to bankruptcy restrictions will become more relaxed. The realisation of the policy therefore depends on the response of credit markets and the extent to which former bankrupts are able to reacquire affordable credit. The regime will clearly provide the markets with more information.
However, there is, of course, no guarantee that the markets will respond ways that government desires. Put crudely, there is nothing to stop the markets rating bankrupts challenged under IA, Sch 4A, para 9(3)(a) if a court, on similar facts, declines to make a BRO (or makes a BRO for a shorter period) in a subsequently decided case. 203 The Regulatory Impact Assessment anticipates that the cost to the Insolvency Service of the new procedures "will be met in part by refocusing investigative resources" but concedes that more specialist examining staff are needed (para 6.22). It also anticipates that through increased numbers of cases, including prosecutions for breach of BROs and BRUs, the bankruptcy restrictions regime will impact on the court system (paras 6.24-6.25). However, on the assumption that only 50% of cases will require a hearing (the rest being settled by BRUs), and taking into account possible savings elsewhere (achieved through the introduction of IPAs in bankruptcy and out-of-court administration procedures in corporate insolvency), the overall impact on the courts was expected to be marginal. The effectiveness of the new legislation is to be monitored after it has been in force for three years (para 11.2).
as "bad" and bankrupts the subject of BROs or BRUs as (in varying degrees) "worse", although it may prove to be significant that basic bankruptcy information will only appear on the individual insolvency register for up to a maximum of 15 months in a run-of-the-mill case.
204
F. POST-BANKRUPTCY INDIVIDUAL VOLUNTARY ARRANGEMENTS
The Enterprise Act 2002, s 264 and Sch 22 introduced as sections 263A-G and 389B
of the Insolvency Act a new set of provisions establishing a "fast-track" IVA procedure administered exclusively by the official receiver, who for the first time, is authorised to act as nominee or supervisor in relation to an IVA. The procedure is only available to debtors who are already bankrupt and the official receiver must be specified in the proposal as the nominee. 205 The proposal must set out the terms of the proposed IVA, a statement of the debtor's affairs and an explanation from the official receiver as to why, in his opinion, an IVA is desirable, giving reasons why the creditors may be expected to approve it. 206 Having received the proposal and agreed to act as nominee, 207 the official receiver is then required to send to the creditors (and any private sector trustee in bankruptcy who is in office) a notice containing prescribed information inviting creditors to approve or reject the proposal. 208 In contrast with the usual IVA procedure outlined in Section B, there is no requirement for a creditors' meeting and the creditors simply vote in favour or against the proposal on the form provided and return it to the official receiver within a prescribed period. 209 There is no scope for creditors to seek modifications of the proposal: it is put to them on a "take it or leave it" basis. 210 The proposal is approved if a majority in excess of three-quarters in value of the creditors who vote are in favour of it.
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The official receiver is obliged to report to the court whether the proposed IVA has been approved or rejected and, if approved, it will take effect and bind all creditors at that time, 212 subject only to possible revocation by the court on grounds of unfair prejudice or material irregularity. 213 Once the time has expired for the IVA to be challenged on those grounds, the official receiver will apply to have the bankruptcy order annulled. 214 The procedure is therefore designed to provide a streamlined exit route out of bankruptcy.
The provision of a more streamlined means of channelling debtors out of bankruptcy into post-bankruptcy IVAs is designed (along with the reforms to IPOs) to advance the policy that debtors who have the ability to pay should make a meaningful contribution towards payment of their debts. 215 By allowing the official receiver to act as nominee and supervisor of post-bankruptcy IVAs, the legislation is also designed to promote competition between the official receiver and the private sector and so stimulate the hitherto moribund market for post-bankruptcy IVAs. 216 The key ingredient is costs. In theory, the official receiver should be able to generate economies of scale and keep costs low. The fact that no creditors' meeting is required and that the proposal is made on a "take it or leave it" basis means that the front-end costs of setting up an IVA can be kept to a minimum. The likely standardisation of proposals should also contribute to further cost reductions over time. The inspiration for the reform derives from the debtor payment plan model in Chapter 13 of the US Bankruptcy Code, 217 although it is no slavish imitation. In Chapter 13, the debtor gets to keep his assets but must make contributions from income over time (usually three years) under a court-approved payment plan. This perhaps gives us some clue as to how the incentives under sections 263A-G are intended to operate. The theoretical enticements for the bankrupt are (i) the annulment of the bankruptcy and (presumably) (ii) the prospect of entering into a "payment plan" style of arrangement under which he may get to keep most, if not all, of his assets. The creditors (so it is claimed) can be expected to agree to such "payment plan" IVAs because (i) in most bankruptcy cases there are no or few assets and (ii) in any event, the reduced costs of IVAs are likely to produce better returns even where the creditors agree to forego their claim to any assets that would be available in bankruptcy. 218 As conceived, the "fast track" post-bankruptcy IVA is therefore a low-cost payment plan model that seeks to offer sufficient benefits to both debtors and creditors to make it viable.
It is questionable whether this procedure will produce the desired results given the overall structure of debtor incentives under the new law. Even if "fast track"
IVAs are better for creditors than bankruptcy because less of the income contributed is absorbed in costs, there are no particularly compelling legal incentives for bankrupts to favour IVAs over bankruptcy. Bankrupts with no or few assets ⎯ and we are told that these are the majority
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⎯ have nothing obvious to lose by staying in bankruptcy. The incentive to opt for an IVA so as to preserve assets simply does not operate. Apart from cost differentials (which benefit creditors rather than debtors)
there is no obvious difference between a "no assets" bankruptcy in which the debtor agrees to a three-year IPA 220 and a three-year "payment plan" IVA. Indeed, the benefit of early discharge, the risk that the debtor may default on the terms of the IVA and end up in bankruptcy anyway and the reduction in the stigma attaching to bankruptcy per se may provide considerable incentives for remaining bankrupt. This is a fortiori if (i) creditors demand IVAs that are longer in duration than three years and (ii) there is no particular advantage in terms of reacquisition of credit between IVA and bankruptcy. 221 It is true that in bankruptcy the debtor runs the risk of being subjected to post-discharge restrictions. professions, can be expected to propose pre-bankruptcy IVAs. 224 Thus, given the overall incentives, the flourishing of "fast track" IVAs appears to depend heavily on the persuasive powers of the official receiver and the human motivation of individual debtors.
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G. CONCLUSION
At the heart of the reforms lies a complex attempt to differentiate "honest" from "culpable" bankrupts based on a policy platform that is concerned with the removal of legal barriers to enterprise and entrepreneurship. On the assumption that only a small minority of bankrupts will end up subject to BROs or BRUs, 226 bankruptcy for the majority looks set to become significantly more liberal in the light of the shorter period before discharge and the reduced scope of pre-discharge bankruptcy restrictions. The disassociation of the "honest" from the "culpable" is achieved principally through the post-discharge restriction regime and is intended to encourage credit providers to liberalise their policies in relation to bankrupts who do not fall foul of it so as to improve the prospects for reacquisition of credit. However, the investment that the new regime requires will only be worth the candle if lenders respond positively to the information it produces. The government has conceded that most bankrupts have no or few assets, 227 hence the emphasis on capturing income through IPOs/IPAs or "fast track" IVAs. This being so, it appears that in the majority of cases, many of which may involve consumer rather than business debtors, the reforms will strengthen the incentives for debtors to shed debt through bankruptcy rather than seeking rehabilitation through an IVA. It therefore seems credible that the 224 For an existing mechanism designed to encourage the use of IVAs in small voluntary bankruptcies see IA, ss 273-4. This enables the court to adjourn a debtor's bankruptcy petition and appoint an insolvency practitioner to consider the viability of an IVA. It is not known whether the provisions are widely used in practice. 225 It would clearly be wrong to assume that all debtors will act in the rational calculating way predicted by certain strands of economic theory. Some may be ashamed of the failure to pay their debts and more concerned to repay as much as they can through an IVA so as to salvage their pride. The attitudes of those who provide access points into the system such as lawyers, insolvency practitioners and debt advisers may also be influential. 226 The figures for directors' disqualifications can be used to produce a crude measure. Currently, disqualifications are running at a rate of roughly 1,500 per annum (source: DTI, Companies in [2003] [2004] ). If we assume that the rate of bankruptcy remains constant at around 25,000 per annum and BROs or BRUs are obtained at the current rate of disqualifications, then significantly less than 10% of bankrupts will end up subject to post-discharge restrictions. 227 Supra, n 218 228 will be sustained or will rise still further. Moreover, subject to possible concerns about credit-rating, especially in the mortgage market, the claim that the main beneficiary of the reforms may turn out to be consumer rather than business bankrupts also appears credible. Given that the post-discharge restrictions regime and the official receiver's new role in relation to IVAs already place additional burdens on the Insolvency Service, it also seems likely that any increase in the incidence of bankruptcy could put considerable pressure on the system. If these fears prove to be accurate − and, in particular, if there is further expansion in the numbers of consumer bankruptcies − there is every likelihood that the current policy will have to be revisited sooner rather than later. Thus, in time, the Enterprise Act reforms may prove to have been something of a high water mark in the history of English insolvency law.
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228 Supra, n 99. 229 Experience in the United States, where bankruptcy filings increased roughly fourfold between 1980 and 2000, while not directly comparable, may be instructive. There Congress has sought to means-test access to Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Consumer debtors whose net monthly income exceeds a defined threshold would be denied access to Chapter 7 and effectively be forced to consider the option of a Chapter 13 income payment plan were the proposal to be enacted. For background and critique see Ziegel, supra n 31; Tabb, supra n 217.
